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Effects of substrate network topologies on competition dynamics
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Department of Physics, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon 305-701, Korea
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We study a competition dynamics, based on the minority game, endowed with various substrate
network structures. We observe the effects of the network topologies by investigating the volatility of
the system and the structure of follower networks. The topology of substrate structures significantly
influences the system efficiency represented by the volatility and such substrate networks are shown
to amplify the herding effect and cause inefficiency in most cases. The follower networks emerging
from the leadership structure show a power-law incoming degree distribution. This study shows
the emergence of scale-free structures of leadership in the minority game and the effects of the
interaction among players on the networked version of the game.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 89.65.Gh, 89.75.Hc
I. INTRODUCTION
The minority game (MG) captures the features of
bounded rationality and inductive reasoning, which are
the radically different viewpoint from that of the tradi-
tional economics, and has become a representative model
of competition dynamics [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. MG has been in-
tensively studied by adopting the agent-based modeling
and statistical mechanical approaches analogous to the
spin glass theory [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. MG
is a repeated game where players choose one out of two
alternatives at each time step, which separates the en-
tire group into two subgroups according to the players’
choice. The essential rule of MG is that those who hap-
pen to be in the minority subgroup with fewer members
win each round of the game. Players watch the m (mem-
ory) last winning choices called histories denoted as µ,
which leads to 2m possible histories. By taking all his-
tories and assigning choice for each of them, they get a
strategy. Each player is allowed to have a limited set of
S strategies. She keeps score for each strategy according
to the m last winning choices, i.e., distinguishes “good”
and “bad” strategies and chooses the best strategy with
the highest score to make a decision for the next step [2].
Even this simplest original model of MG shows quite
interesting properties such that the volatility σ, the stan-
dard deviation of the time series A(t) which counts the
number of players choosing a certain alternative, follows
the scaling relation σ2/N = f(2m/N) [6]. Furthermore,
this scaling function is divided into two phases called
symmetric and asymmetric phases, where the strategy
distribution and the system predictability are differ-
ent [6]. The volatility is considered as an important
quantity because it is the measure of the system inef-
ficiency, provided that the maximum number of winners
is bounded by N/2. This behavior of the volatility has,
therefore, caught much attention from researchers.
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Besides such efforts to unveil the structure and proper-
ties of the original MG, some extensions or variations of
the original model are introduced to adopt more realis-
tic aspects or for mathematical convenience [7, 12]. The
concept of social interaction among players in terms of
“imitation,” superimposed with the global information,
is introduced in Refs. [15, 16]. Later, in Ref. [17], players
in MG are connected by the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) random
graph [18]. In their model, an undirected substrate net-
work G of the ER type is constructed between players
before the game. For each moment of choice, each player
first chooses one of two alternatives according to her own
best strategy, but she does not use the choice immedi-
ately. Instead, she compares the points, defined as the
number of victories of each player from the beginning of
the game, of her neighbors connected by the substrate
network and follows the choice of the player with the
maximum points. If no neighbor is better than herself,
she makes the final decision by following her own best
strategy. After some time, the leadership structure, i.e.,
who follows whom, appears and is a directed subset F of
the underlying substrate network G. Anghel et al. shows
that despite the Poisson degree distribution of the sub-
strate ER graph, the incoming degrees of this “follower”
network F are described by a power-law distribution with
a sharp cut-off [17], which indicates the scale-free struc-
ture known to be ubiquitous in the real world network
systems [19, 20, 21].
In this paper, we generalize the approach of Anghel et
al. by varying the types of substrate networks, such as
the ER random graph [18], regular lattices, small-world
networks [22], and scale-free networks [23, 24], since the
real social network structures are known to be much more
complicated than the ER random graph. Furthermore,
we observe not only the structure of the follower net-
works, but also the volatility σ. There have been quite
a number of studies that set up “recently recognized”
complex network structures in several systems of inter-
acting components, e.g., the Ising model [25, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30], the voter model [31, 32, 33, 34, 35], the pris-
oners’ dilemma game [36, 37, 38, 39, 40], the snowdrift
game [40, 41, 42], the Boolean game [43], etc. All these
2works have provided opportunities to understand both
the systems themselves and the properties of complex
networks better. Similarly, we expect that this work also
reveals some features of both sides.
II. RULES OF THE GAME AND SUBSTRATE
NETWORK STRUCTURES
The rules are basically the same as in Ref. [17] as stated
in the previous section, except for using various kinds of
networks as underlying substrate structures. Each player
follows her neighbor with the best performance by imi-
tating the neighbor’s action (choice) at each time step, as
well as keeping records of her own strategies. We set the
number of each player’s strategies as S = 2 and change
the memory m to observe the behavior of MG systems.
Similar to other studies on MG, we confirmed that most
qualitative features do not change for other values of S.
As undirected substrate networks, we use the ER ran-
dom graph [18], the one-dimensional (1D) regular lat-
tice where each player is connected to her neighbors
two or fewer lattice spacings away, the Watts-Strogatz
(WS) small-world network [22], the Baraba´si-Albert
(BA) growing scale-free network with the degree expo-
nent γ = 3 where the degree distribution p(k) ∼ k−γ [23],
and the Goh-Kahng-Kim (GKK) static scale-free network
with γ = 2 [24]. For the volatility function, especially we
focus on the WS case, varying the rewiring probability
p, since the volatility function changes its shape contin-
uously but drastically with the disorder parameter p. In
addition, we try some real-world social networks such as
a coauthorship network [44] and bulletin board system
(BBS) networks, composed of BBS users connected by
their replies among each other [45], to test the generality
of the results.
III. VOLATILITY FUNCTION
The term volatility σ in MG is defined as the standard
deviation of the time series A(t), representing the differ-
ence between the number of agents who choose a certain
alternative and the other at time t, as follows:
σ =
√
〈A2(t)〉 − 〈A(t)〉2. (1)
Here the angular bracket refers to the average over time.
If A(t) is a random sequence of two alternatives with
equal probabilities, σ2/N = 1/4, and the situation is the
so-called “coin-toss” case. Minimizing this volatility cor-
responds to maximizing the efficiency of the system, since
the amount of deviation from the average value N/2 (by
symmetry) is viewed as the waste of available resources.
In this sense, the volatility is a reciprocal measure of the
system efficiency.
A remarkable result of early studies on the original MG
model is that σ2/N does not depend independently on m
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FIG. 1: Typical time series A(t) with N = 1001 andm = 2 for
(a) ER, (b) 1D regular lattice, (c) BA, and (d) GKK substrate
networks.
and N , but only on the ratio α = 2m/N [6]. This scaling
relation is explained as the effect caused by the relative
size difference in the number of player N and the size
of effective strategy space 2m, related to the distribution
and overlap of strategies among players. For α ≪ 1,
σ2 ∼ 1/α and this phase is called a crowded, unpre-
dictable, and symmetric phase. On the other hand, when
α ≫ 1, σ2 ≃ 1/4 (the system approaches the coin-toss
case) and this phase is called an uncrowded, predictable,
and asymmetric phase. The phase separation has been
investigated by analogy with spin formalism [11, 13, 14].
Extensive simulations of MG on various substrate net-
works show that in contrast to the case of the original MG
where the clear scaling behavior of volatility is shown,
the volatility σ2/N is not a function of the single vari-
able α = 2m/N . Moreover, variance of σ2/N , for each
realization, is significantly large for some cases. Figure 1
shows typical times series for various substrate networks
and the volatility is shown in Fig. 2. For the ER substrate
network, the form of volatility is similar to the original
MG model. Other topologies, however, totally change
the shape of the volatility function against α. For a 1D
regular lattice, except for the very small value of α, the
volatility is so large that the system can be considered
as inefficient or maladapted. In the case of a very small
value of α, on the other hand, the volatility becomes
quite small [46]. [Notice the scale of the volatility axis
in Fig. 2(b)] For N = 1001, extremely small volatility
shown in Fig. 1(b) happens only for m = 2, the small-
est value of m used in the simulation, and increasing the
value just to m = 3 causes inefficiency. The volatility
for m = 2 in this case (1D regular lattice) is observed as
the smallest volatility among all the simulation results.
Therefore, from the perspective of the system efficiency
defined as the reciprocal of the volatility, a 1D regular
lattice as substrate and a very small value of α are the
best ingredients for an efficient system.
For BA and GKK substrate networks, the shapes of
volatility against α quite resemble each other, in spite of
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FIG. 2: Volatility σ2/N distribution according to the value α = 2m/N , for (a) ER, (b) 1D regular lattice, (c) BA, (d) GKK,
(e) bar BBS, and (f) loco BBS substrate networks. The numbers of players are N = 1001 for (a)–(d), N = 4461 for (e), and
N = 7410 for (f). For each value of memory m, the results of 500 simulations for (a)–(d) are recorded as a histogram, whereas
(e) and (f) are from 100 realizations. Average values of the volatility are drawn at the bottom of each graph.
the difference in the creation mechanism [23, 24] and the
degree exponent γ. [Compare Figs. 2(c) and 2(d)] The
peculiar part, compared with the original MG or MG
on ER substrate network, is the increasing behavior of
volatility for small α. Since MG stems from economics
where social networks among people are important, we
also use BBS networks in a university [45] as examples of
real social networks for the simulation. The two BBS net-
works have their own characteristic shapes of the volatil-
ity as shown in Figs. 2(e) and 2(f). From the simulation
result, it is clear that the topology of substrate networks
significantly influences the dependence of system volatil-
ity on the parameter α. Especially, there is a drastic
difference between the ER random graph and 1D regu-
lar lattice because the randomness or disorderedness is
extremely different, although both of these two networks
have homogeneous degree distributions. The scale-free
networks with heterogeneous degree distributions seem
to be located somewhere in between those two extremes.
The fact that the underlying network topology effects on
the ability to communicate and the information transfer
has been shown recently [47] and the volatility function
of MG on networks here is another good example.
For the more systematic approach, we use the WS
small-world network [22]. One convenient aspect about
the WS network is that we can control the disorderedness
of the structure by changing the rewiring probability p.
Figure 3 shows the result of volatility from MG on WS
networks with different values of p. By definition of the
rewiring probability p, the case of p → 0 (p → 1) corre-
sponds to the 1D regular lattice (ER random network),
respectively. As one can imagine, increasing p from 0
to 1 (adding disorderedness to the substrate network)
continuously changes the form of volatility from the 1D
regular lattice case to the ER random network case. Fig-
ure 3(a) and (b), furthermore, show a certain pattern of
change depending on the value of p. For small values of
p (Fig. 3(a)), the volatility for large values of α changes
rapidly as p increases. On the other hand, for large val-
ues of p (Fig. 3(b)), the volatility for small values of α
changes rapidly as p increases, while that for large α is
almost fixed.
The region of small values of α = 2m/N is tradition-
ally called the symmetric or crowded phase in the original
MG, which means that the number of players N is much
larger than the effective size of the strategy space, so that
many players come to use the same strategies. Large val-
ues of α correspond to the asymmetric, anticrowded, or
information-rich phase, because the lack of overusage of
strategies causes inequality of strategies’ scores in the
whole system, which leads to the possibility of exploiting
the information and predicting. According to the proper-
ties of WS small-world networks, the average path length
of the network drops dramatically as p increases, even for
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Volatility σ2/N according to the value
α = 2m/N for WS small-world network with (a) small, and
(b) large values of rewiring probability p. The number of
players is N = 1001, and each player is connected to her
neighbors two or fewer lattice spacings away. For each value
of memory m, the results of 500 simulations are averaged.
The solid lines are guides to the eyes, and the horizontal line
(σ2/N = 0.25) indicates the coin-toss case. Each (red) line
corresponds to a limiting case of p, i.e., the 1D regular lattice
in (a) and the ER random graph in (b), respectively.
small values of p, while the clustering coefficient finally
drops for large values of p. Therefore, we can conclude
that for small values of p, a radically decreasing aver-
age path length, possibly related to the efficiency of the
information transfer, affects the information-rich phase,
i.e., the anticrowded phase for the large value of α. For
large values of p, a sharply dropping value of cluster-
ing coefficient seems to affect the crowded effect for the
crowded phase with a small value of α. From this result,
we can see that the disorderedness of the substrate net-
works clearly influences the system behavior, in regard
to the volatility.
It is worthwhile to note that for most regions of pa-
rameters and types of substrate networks, the volatility
is larger than that in the original MG and even the ran-
dom coin-toss case. In other words, the system with net-
works performs less effectively in general. The reason
why the original MG system cannot reach a Nash equi-
librium, i.e., σ ∼ O(1), is that each player does not con-
sider her own “market impact” on the game and causes
the herding behavior [48]. Adding substrate networks,
which enable players to interact with one another, even
more accelerates this herding effect thanks to the locally
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FIG. 4: The interrelationship among the average scores of
players, their degrees in the substrate network, and the aver-
age numbers of outgoing link changes per game. Each data
point represents the values corresponding to each player av-
eraged over 500 games, each of which is composed of 20000
steps. (m = 2) The substrate network is the BA model with
1001 nodes.
common references and leads to the inefficiency. Basi-
cally, each player plays the game without any centralized
control and this sort of inefficiency called “price of anar-
chy,” due to such decentralization, has gotten attention
recently [49]. An onset of bubble phenomena by rumors
from peers is not unusual in economy, which is a good
example of the social network effect.
5 0
 0.05
 0.1
 0.15
 0.2
 0.25
 0.3
 0.01  0.1  1
Pr
ed
ict
ab
ilit
y 
H
α = 2m / N
ER
1D regular lattice
BA
GKK
FIG. 5: Predictability H according to the value α = 2m/N ,
for each substrate network whose size N = 1001. Each point
and error bar are drawn values averaged over 100 games, each
of which is composed of 20000 steps.
Figure 4(a) shows that a “hub” with many connections
in the first place is likely to gain a lower score than other
players, due to the herding behavior of the players fol-
lowing the hub. A hub tends to be more likely to change
its outgoing link in the follower network during a game,
as shown in Fig. 4(b). We can easily see that a player’s
score and the frequency of the outgoing link change are
closely related as well, from Fig. 4(c). In sum, hubs are
likely to lose due to their followers, which leads to the
frequent changes of their outgoing links in the follower
network. For many other networks and parameters, this
pattern is observed in common. Players with large de-
grees, therefore, are not able to take advantage of the sit-
uation. Oppositely, they suffer from the lowered chance
to win because of their followers who will make the same
choice with them, which of course the hub players do not
want, considering the very definition of the minority rule.
Besides the volatility, the predictability H is also an
important quantity in the MG system and characterizes
the phase transition. The predictability is defined as [4,
5],
H =
1
2m
∑
µ
〈A|µ〉2, (2)
where µ is the m-bit history, the summation over µ is for
all the possible 2m values of µ, and 〈A|µ〉 is the tempo-
ral average value of the outcomes of the game for each
history µ, composed of the last m bits of winning choice.
The predictability, therefore, measures the “determinis-
tic” tendency of the game for each given history. The
larger values of the predictability implies that the out-
come of the game at each time is more predictable and
each player tends to stick to a single strategy, which gives
the analogy of the ordered spin state in the spin-glass
theory.
In the original MG model, the predictability is in the
vicinity of 0 at the symmetric phase (corresponding to
FIG. 6: (Color online) Snapshot of typical structure of fol-
lower network, where the ER random graph is used as sub-
strate in this case. Thin gray lines stand for the substrate
network and thick black arrows for the follower network.
small α = 2m/N values) and starts to increase with the
onset of the asymmetric phase as α increases. This char-
acteristic of H according to α is the reason why the sym-
metric phase is called the unpredictable phase and the
asymmetric phase is called the predictable phase. Fig-
ure 5 shows the predictability values according to α for
our MG model with various substrate network structures.
Like the original MG model, the predictability starts to
increase from a certain threshold value of α, below which
the predictability is essentially 0. The threshold values,
however, depend on substrate network topologies. Com-
paring Figs. 2(a)–2(d) and 5, we can see that, for MG on
ER random networks, the volatility reaches its minimum
value and the predictability begins to increase for smaller
value of α than for the game on the other networks.
IV. STRUCTURES OF THE FOLLOWER
NETWORKS
After the transient period, the follower network struc-
ture reaches its steady state and only a small fraction of
nodes change their outgoing link at each time step (less
than ten percent even for the worst case). In addition,
even though some nodes change their outgoing link, the
characteristic features such as the degree distribution do
not change. Therefore, we analyze the structure of the
follower networks for each substrate network topology.
Figure 6 shows a typical structure of follower networks
for the case of the ER substrate network [50]. If node
a follows node b, the direction of link a → b is estab-
lished. Hubs with large incoming degree (in-degree) are
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FIG. 7: Incoming degree distribution of the follower networks
for N = 1001 whose substrate networks are (a) the ER ran-
dom graph with connecting probability p = 0.1 [18], (b) the
BA model with m0 = m = 4 [23], and (c) the GKK model
with γ = 2 and average number of degrees = 10 [24]. Empty
squares () correspond to the degrees of substrate networks.
The degree distribution of each follower network is drawn from
500 realizations of MG.
easily noticed. In-degree distribution of follower networks
shown in Fig. 7 implies the scale-free structure of follower
networks for (a) ER, (b) BA, and (c) GKK substrate net-
works. We also observed the same results of the fat-tailed
in-degree distributions for the e-print archive coauthor-
ship network [44] and BBS networks [45], as shown in
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FIG. 8: Incoming degree distribution of the follower networks
for whose substrate networks are (a) the e-print archive coau-
thorship network with 49983 nodes [44], (b) the bar BBS net-
work with 4461 nodes [45], and (c) the loco BBS network
with 7410 nodes [45]. Empty squares () correspond to the
degrees of substrate networks. The degree distribution of each
follower network is drawn from 100 realizations of MG.
Fig. 8. Cutoffs in Fig. 7(a), also stated in Ref. [17], are
due to the fact that the number of links for each node is
bounded by the Poisson degree distribution of the sub-
strate network. In this respect, the scale-free structure
is conserved for MG. In addition, from Figs. 7 and 8, we
can see that the larger the memory size m is, the nar-
rower the distribution gets. In other words, larger mem-
7ory sizes of individual players tend to lower the possibility
of the emergence of large hubs with many connections.
Interestingly, this phenomenon can be interpreted in that
“smarter” players effectively prevent the appearance of
“dictators” with big power.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Even though both MG and complex networks have
been heavily studied to understand the structure and dy-
namics of complex systems, the interaction among play-
ers in the MG system via complex networks has not
drawn much attention so far. By numerically studying
this subject, we have shown that the topology of un-
derlying substrate networks significantly influences the
well-known properties of MG. We also demonstrate the
emergence of scale-free coordination structures, as sug-
gested in earlier studies.
Volatility, traditionally considered as the reciprocal
measure of the system efficiency, of MG on various net-
works has quite different structures from the original
MG, depending on the topology of the substrate. Es-
pecially, MG on 1D regular lattice with very small mem-
ory size seems to exploit the system effectively as shown
in Fig. 1(b), although the information transfer is known
not to be efficient in regular lattices. In contrast, in
most cases the performance of systems is worse than the
original MG or the random choice, due to the enhanced
herding behavior provided by interactions via substrate
networks. Disorderedness of the substrate networks, re-
flected by the rewiring probability p of the WS small-
world network, affects the form of the volatility function
in different domains, depending on the degree of disor-
deredness.
MG is famous for its simple rules, and at the same time
for its complex structure including many counterintuitive
aspects. We have shown that the properties of substrate
interaction topology, such as the degree distribution and
randomness, play a great role in the system. Still, there
are many open questions about the qualitative and quan-
titative properties of this system. The original MG has
been investigated not only by numerical simulation, but
also by analytic approaches which have accelerated the
understanding of this complex game. The analytic ap-
proach of MG with interactions among players has also
started [17], and we hope that more research on this sub-
ject of the emergence of complex behavior, including MG
with interactions, will be continued in the future.
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